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CASENOTE
CLINGING TO HISTORY: THE SUPREME COURT
(MIS)INTERPRETS FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
801(d)(1)(B) AS CONTAINING A TEMPORAL REQUIREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rules)
resulted in a more liberal standard for the admission and use
of various forms of evidence.' For example, the Rules altered
the definition of "relevant evidence" increasing the scope of
evidence that can be presented to a jury.2 Also, the Rules per-
mit prior inconsistent statements to be admitted as substantive
evidence rather than for impeachment purposes only.3 The Ad-
1. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993) (abolishing the Frye rule for the admission of expert testimony).
2. In this note, the Advisory Committee compares the relevancy standard under
the Federal Rules to the earlier common law standard. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory
committee's note.
3. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). The Advisory Committee stated that "[pirior incon-
sistent statements traditionally have been admissible to impeach but not as sub-
stantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. FED. R. EViD.
801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee cites the California
Law Revision Commission for the rationale underlying this rule. Under California's
evidentiary provisions, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) "admits inconsistent statements of witnesses
because the dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect are largely
nonexistent." Id. These dangers are eliminated because "[tihe declarant is in court
and may be examined and cross-examined with regard to his statements and their
subject matter." Id. In addition, "the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true
than the testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to
the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the controversy
that gave rise to the litigation." Id. McCormick reasons:
The reasons for the change of face . . . may be explored by the two
questioners in the presence of the trier of fact, under oath, casting light
on which is the true story and which the false. It is hard to escape the
view that evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, when declarant is
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visory Committee enunciated these changes, and other changes
resulting from the adoption of the Rules, in their notes accom-
panying the Rules.4
Despite the Committee's best efforts, not all of the Rules'
intended effects were set out in the notes. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the Supreme Court interpreted the
Rules as superseding the conventional common law doctrine,
the Frye standard for admissibility of expert testimony,' in a
manner not noted by the Advisory Committee.7 Recently, the
Court faced a similar situation in Tome v. United States."
In Tome, the United States argued that the adoption of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)" abolished the pre-motive
rule' ° for the admissibility of prior consistent statements of-
fered to rebut certain types of impeachment. This significant
alteration in the common law was not noted by the Commit-
tee," and the Court refused to accept the argument. Instead,
on the stand to explain it if he can, has in high degree the safeguards of
examined testimony.
CHARLES I. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251 (John W. Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCORMICK].
4. In the note accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 401, the Advisory Com-
mittee describes the Rule's standard for relevancy as having a "tendency to make the
existence' of the fact to be proved 'more probable or less probable,'" and as one not
'unworkable" or "unrealistic." FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note. The Su-
preme Court has determined that "[t]he Rule's basic standard of relevance . . . is a
liberal one." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794; see supra note 3.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
6. Id. at 2793.
7. Nowhere in the notes accompanying Rules 702 or 703 does the Committee
state that the Frye rule is superseded by the Federal Rules. FED. R. EVID. 702, 703
advisory committee's notes.
8. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
9. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) says that a statement is not hearsay if "the declarant testi-
fies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrica-
tion or improper influence or motive. . . ." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
10. The pre-motive rule requires that "if the attacker has charged bias, interest,
corrupt influence, contrivance to falsify, or want of capacity to observe or remem-
ber . . . the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless
the consistent statement was made before the source . . . originated." MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, § 47. This Rule is also referred to as the temporal requirement and the
two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this piece.
11. Brief for the United States at *17-18, 1994 WL 262340, Tome v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
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the Court stated that timing is the only factor affecting the
rebuttal value of prior consistent statements. 2 Consequently,
in federal court the admissibility of an earlier consistent state-
ment under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) still depends on whether the prior
consistent statement was made before or after the motive to
fabricate arose.
This casenote examines the Court's reasoning in Tome as
well as the background against which this decision should be
interpreted. Part II traces the historical development of the pre-
motive requirement through an examination of case law and
treatises written before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Part III considers how the lower federal courts have
handled the issue following the 1975 adoption of the Rules.
Part IV interprets the analysis employed by the majority, con-
currence, and dissent in Tome. Each opinion will be examined
in comparison with previous Supreme Court opinions concerning
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part IV will also illustrate the
misguided nature of the interpretive method used by the justic-
es when viewed in light of these earlier decisions and approach-
es to the use of prior consistent statements. Finally, Part V
predicts the probable effects of the Tome decision on child
abuse prosecutions because prior consistent statements are
often used in such cases.
II. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEMPORAL
REQUIREMENT
A. Origin and Development"
At one time, courts admitted any prior statement consistent
with testimony.' This rule changed two hundred years ago
when courts began to exclude any prior consistent statement
12. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 705.
13. For a general history of the admissibility of prior consistent statements, see
Edward D. Ohlbaum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of
Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 231, 234-45 [hereinafter Hobgoblin].
14. Lutterell v. Reynell, 86 Eng. Rep. 887, (1670) (holding that "[tihough a hear-
say was not to be allowed as a direct evidence, yet it might be made use of ... to
prove that [the witness] was confident to himself, whereby his testimony was corrobo-
rated.").
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proffered to rebut a charge of recent falsification that was not
made before the motive to lie arose. This temporal requirement,
also referred to as the pre-motive rule, originated in The King
v. Parker.5 In that case, the King's Bench refused to rehear
the robbery conviction of two men obtained on the allegedly
peijured testimony of the defendant, even though evidence of
prior consistent statements had been presented." This shift in
admissibility occurred as a result of a growing judicial animosi-
ty toward hearsay statements in general. 7
During the 1800s, state courts began to embrace the tempo-
ral requirement, illustrating a growing disdain for the use of
prior consistent statements that did not precede the witness'
supposed motive to falsify."8 In Clever v. Hillberry,"9 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that "consonant declara-
tions may be given in contradiction of evidence tending to show
that the testimony at the bar is a fabrication of a recent date,
and to show that the same statement was made before its ulti-
mate effect on the question trying could have been fore-
seen ... ,,' However, the same court would not admit state-
ments made after the tainting motive appeared.2' Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the only exception to
the general rule prohibiting prior consistent statements was in
those instances "where a design to misrepresent is charged
upon the witness in consequence of his relation to the party or
15. 99 Eng. Rep. 634 (1783).
16. Id. at 636. In a footnote, the justices quoted a treatise on contract law which
stated the rule as follows:
In an ordinary case [prior consistent statements] would be at least super-
fluous . . . until there is some particular reason for impeaching them as
false; which reason may be repelled by circumstances, showing that the
motive upon which it is supposed to have been founded could not have
had existence at the time when the previous relation was made, and
which therefore repel the supposition of the fact related being an after-
thought or falsification.
Id. at 635 n.(f).
17. See Hobgoblin, supra note 13, at 235-36.
18. See, e.g., Connor v. People, 33 P. 159, 162 (Colo. 1893).
19. 9 A. 647 (Pa. 1887).
20. Id. at 651 (quoting McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa. 425 (1847)); see also In re Hesdra's
Will, 23 N.E. 555, 558 (N.Y. 1890) (noting the exception to the general rule against
admission of prior consistent statements where such statements are made before the
motive to falsify existed) (citation omitted).
21. Clever, 9 A. at 651.
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the cause, in which case it seems it may be proper to show that
he made a similar statement before that relation existed."22
Federal courts also embraced the pre-motive requirement. In
Ellicott v. Pearl,23 Justice Story stated that when the witness'
"testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date, or a
complaint recently made;-. . . in order to repel such imputation,
proof of the antecedent declaration of the party may be admit-
ted."24 However, rather than allowing pre-motive declarations
full admissibility, both state and federal courts routinely accept-
ed such testimony only to bolster the credibility of the principal
witness.
Some courts during this period, however, refused to adopt the
pre-motive rule. Most notably, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that when the credibility of a witness is attacked,
any earlier consistent declaration is admissible to repel the
attack.2" Other courts allowed for the admission of earlier tes-
timony to rebut evidence of prior inconsistent statements
brought out on cross-examination. These cases also precluded
the use of such statements for any purpose other than rehabili-
tation. This approach was based on the rationale that the state-
ment was not offered for its truth, but only to demonstrate that
the witness had made earlier consistent statements.28
The aversion toward post-motive statements continued into
the twentieth century in state courts across the country.
Some courts modified the general rule and admitted prior con-
sistent statements to rebut any type of impeachment."0 Howev-
er, despite this liberalization of the general rule, state courts
essentially remained united in their opposition to earlier consis-
22. Connor, 33 P. at 162 (quoting Robb v. Hackley, 23 Wend. 50 (1840)).
23. 35 U.S. 412 (1836).
24. Id. at 439.
25. Id.
26. State v. Twitty, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 449 (1823). The same court later allowed a
witness to testify to his own earlier consonant statements, regardless of when they
were made. State v. George, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 324, 328 (1848).
27. See, e.g., Henderson v. Jones, 10 Serg. & Rawle 322, 323-24 (Pa. 1823).
28. See In re Hesdra's Will, 23 N.E. at 558 (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., People v. Singer, 89 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (N.Y. 1949).
30. See State v. Rose, 111 S.E.2d 311, 314 (N.C. 1959); Minton v. La Follette
Coal, Iron & Ry., 101 S.W. 178, 181 (Tenn. 1907) (allowing witness testimony to
establish credibility of plaintiff).
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tent declarations that did not meet the temporal require-
ment.3' Federal courts, on the other hand, were not as uniform
in their application of the pre-motive rule. Several circuits re-
tained the temporal requirement for admissibility, 2 while oth-
er circuits refused to endorse this bright-line exclusionary
rule.3"
B. Justifications for the Pre-motive Rule
Some courts justify the pre-motive rule by holding that any
statement that was not made before the motive to lie arose is
not relevant to the issue of credibility because the same reason
for falsifying trial testimony existed at the time of the earlier
remarks.34 Thus, the prior consistent statement is no more
reliable than the one given at trial.35 Other courts emphasize
that the witness could validate a story by repetition or even
create evidence if the pre-motive rule is not applied. 5
Courts rejecting the pre-motive rule have worked within the
same parameters as those that support the rule. These courts
speak of the general unreliability of prior consistent statements
except for when the testimony of the witness is assailed as a
recent fabrication. However, their rationale changes when the
issue of timing is considered. According to the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the limitation is an "unnecessary refine-
ment" because of the "relevancy" of such statements notwith-
31. See Butler v. Parrocha, 43 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Va. 1947); State v. Murley, 212 P.2d
801, 804-05 (Wash. 1949)
32. See Grunethal v. Long Island R.R., 388 F.2d 480, 483 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 393
U.S. 156 (1968) (reversed on other grounds); United States v. Leggett, 312 F.2d 566,
572 (4th Cir. 1962).
33. See United States v. Bays, 448 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 957 (1972); Hangar v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104-05 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969); Copes v. United States 345 F.2d 723, 726 & n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
34. See, e.g., Clever v. Hillberry, 9 A. 647, 651 (Pa. 1887).
35. See id.
36. See Leggett, 312 F.2d at 572 ("[A] person might concoct an entirely false ac-
count of some happening and, after relating this account to a dozen of his neighbors,
might call them in corroboration when at a later time he told the same untruthful
story on the witness stand.").
37. Hangar v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1119 (1969).
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standing the time they were made.8 The D.C. Circuit Court
agreed, stressing that there should be no "special emphasis on
the time [the statement] was made" because certain indicia of
reliability were present at the time of testimony regarding the
earlier ,declaration. 9 These reliability factors included the fact
that "[tihe jury ... had before it the accuser, the circumstances
in which [the statement] was made, and the spontaneous denial
of the accusation by the accused. Finally, the declarant was
available and subjected to extensive cross-examination as to her
testimony and to all prior statements ... .4'
Many commentators have supported the imposition of a tem-
poral requirement. These academics promoted the rule and its
justification in a manner similar to that of the supporting
courts.4 For example, according to McCormick, "if the attacker
has charged bias, interest, corrupt influence, contrivance to
falsify, or want of capacity to observe or remember ... the
prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge
unless the consistent statement was made before the source...
originated."42 As Wigmore also explains:
A consistent statement, at a time prior to the existence of a
fact said to indicate bias, interest, or corruption, will effec-
tively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence;
because it is thus made to appear that the statement in the
form now uttered was independent of the discrediting influ-
ence.
43
Other writers, however, have criticized the application of the
pre-motive rule and even the exclusion of prior consistent state-
ments in general. According to Edmund Morgan, a former
Royall Professor at Harvard Law School, the dangers that justi-
fy ,the exclusion of hearsay testimony (the statement was not
38. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
39. Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BRADNER, RULES OF EVIDENCE AS PRESCRIBED BY THE
COMMON LAW FOR THE TRIAL OF ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS § 12 (Chicago, Callaghan
and Co. eds., 2d ed. 1898); WILLIAM P. RICHARDSON, THE LAv OF EVIDENCE § 530
(Jerome Prince ed., 8th ed. 1955).
42. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 47.
43. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1128 (Chadbourn rev.
1972).
1995] 465
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made in court, not under oath, not in the presence of the jury
and not subject to immediate cross-examination) are not present
when a witness is available to testify and does so." Thus,
there is no valid reason to keep such evidence from the jury."'
Jack Weinstein, a professor of Law at Columbia University,
agrees, calling the classification of many out-of-court statements
as hearsay a "practical absurdity" since the declarant is testify-
ing and subject to cross-examination. 46 Even Wigmore changes
his position on the timing requirement when dealing with im-
peachment by a prior inconsistent statement. He states that the
timing requirement is an unjust burden because a consonant
statement is relevant to the credibility of the witness no matter
when it was uttered.47 Consequently, prior to the adoption of
the Federal Rules, no consensus existed among courts or com-
mentators regarding the appropriateness of the pre-motive rule.
III. FEDERAL RULE 801(d)(1)(B): GROWING UNEASINESS WITH
THE PRE-MOTIVE RULE
A. Initial Acceptance of the Pre-motive Rule
In 1965, Chief Justice Warren organized a committee charged
with drafting rules of evidence for use in the federal courts."
The final product, after Supreme Court and legislative approval,
was the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules specifically ad-
dress the admissibility of prior consistent statements. 49 Federal
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) states that so long as the declarant testifies
and is subject to cross-examination, any earlier statement by
44. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 192 (1948) [hereinafter Hearsay Dangers].
45. Id. Morgan is arguing for the admissibility of all prior statements regardless
of purpose and without the requirement of any allegations of falsification. Id. at 192-
96.
46. Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 333
(1961); see also JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 62
(1947) (allowing prior consistent statements to be used to defend a witness accused of
a recent fabrication).
47. WIGMORE, supra note 43, § 1126 (discussing the timing requirement with
respect to the utterance of prior consistent statements after impeachment with prior
inconsistent statements).
48. Edward W. Cleary, Introduction to FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS III (West 1993). The project took more than five years. Id.
49. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B).
466 [Vol. 29:459
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that witness is admissible if "consistent with the declarant's
testimony and ... offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive. ,,50
Despite its linguistic consistency with many prior common
law decisions dealing with the same issue,5 this Rule expand-
ed the use of prior consistent testimony. Rather than limit
statements admissible under 801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitation, the
Advisory Committee specifically stated that they were admissi-
ble for substantive purposes.52 The Committee did not, howev-
er, state in the Rule or the accompanying notes whether the
Rules codified the temporal requirement."
The Advisory Committee's lack of clarity as to the existence
of a timing element in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) prompted questions
about whether the pre-motive rule survived the creation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Initially, many federal courts of
appeals continued to require antecedent consistent statements,
admitting only statements made before the alleged contamina-
tion. 4 Some courts reasoned that the common law pre-motive
rule was implicit in the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) since that
language was very similar to the language used in many deci-
sions made prior to the adoption of the Rules.55 In support of
this position, the courts noted that, unlike other changes
spelled out in the Advisory Committee's notes, the Committee
did not point out any alteration in the prior common law re-
garding the interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)." Other courts
simply followed the reasoning of the former common law deci-
sions with no reference to the relationship between the lan-
guage of the new rule and those cases.57
50. Id.
51. See FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee's note and cases cited therein.
52. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
53. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); -Unit-
ed States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Williams,
573 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. See Quinto, 582 F.2d at 232-33.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating
that prior consistent statements are "of no probative value to rebut an allegation of
recent fabrication when the declarants motive in making both statements was the
same 'for the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity.'") (quoting
1995] 467
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B. A Shift Towards a More Flexible Standard
The rationale underlying the pre-motive rule came under
increased criticism in subsequent cases. Appellate courts began
to question the bright-line distinction between what should and
should not be admissible to "rebut an express or implied charge
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."58 Specifi-
cally, the courts began to examine the effects of the Rules'
"liberal relevancy" definition on the admissibility of prior consis-
tent statements.59 Since relevancy under the Rules is defined
as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence,"" these
courts reasoned that any earlier consonant statement, regard-
less of the time uttered, would have some rebuttal value.6'
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, "the case law indicates that the existence of a motive to
fabricate when the [prior consistent] statement is made is a
matter of relevance."62 The court further held that such a
statement "is relevant under Rule 401 [because] Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not impose the requirement that the state-
ment must have been made before the motion [sic] to
fabricate."63 Thus, the courts of appeals disagreed on the ad-
missibility of any post-motive statement. This disparity between
the circuits finally caught the attention of the Supreme Court
in 1994 when it granted certiorari in Tome v. United States."
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 801-117-18 (1981)).
58. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 344 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Miller,
874 F.2d 1255, 1272 (9th Cir. 1989).
60. FED. R. EviD. 401.
61. Tome, 3 F.3d at 344. "[T]he relevance of the prior consistent statement is
more accurately determined by evaluating the strength of the motive to lie, the cir-
cumstances in which the statement is made, and the declarant's demonstrated pro-
pensity to lie." Id. at 350.
62. United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904 (3d Cir. 1992).
63. Id.
64. 114 S. Ct. 1048 (1994) (mem.).
468 [Vol. 29:459
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IV. THE TOME OPINION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Matthew W. Tome, the defendant, and Beverly Padilla were
the divorced parents of A.T., born in 1985. Following their legal
separation in 1988, Tome was granted primary physical custody
of his daughter while Padilla retained joint custody rights and
saw her daughter on weekends and every other two weeks
during the summer.65
In August of 1989, Padilla petitioned the court to gain prima-
ry custody of A.T., but the court denied her petition. However,
the court awarded her custody during the summer of 1990 and
scheduled a follow-up hearing on the matter for August 24,
1990.6" Padilla and A.T. did not attend this hearing. Rather,
Padilla notified Colorado authorities of A.T.'s allegations of
sexual abuse by her father on August 27th. In August 1991,
authorities arrested Tome on charges of "knowingly engaging in
sexual acts with his daughter, an Indian child under the age of
twelve....
At trial, the prosecution called A.T., then six and one-half
years old, as its first witness.8 She testified that her father
had sexual contact with her at various times when he had
custody of her. The defense cross-examined A.T. over two days
with a one day recess in between.69 On the first day, A.T. tes-
tified with responses that were "immediate and ranged from
single word responses to complete and relatively detailed sen-
tences."7' However, on the second day the testimony was
strained. Some of A.T.'s answers came "as much as 40-55 sec-
onds" after the question, and even then her responses were
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 344-45. Mr. Tome was charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241 with
"engag[ing] in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12
years" which is punishable by up to life imprisonment or fines. This section applies
to all "[o]ffenses committed within Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
68. 3 F.3d at 345.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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often "imprecise or unclear."71 Throughout this process, the
defense repeatedly questioned A.T. regarding her feelings for
her mother, her desire to reside with her mother, and her be-
liefs about the possible effects the trial would have on her
mother's custodial rights.v2
Following this examination, the government proffered testi-
mony from several witnesses concerning statements made to
them by A.T. regarding the alleged abuse.7" These statements
were offered under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because, the pros-
ecution argued, the defense's questioning of A.T. amounted to a
charge that "she had fabricated the allegations of abuse in
order to live with her mother in Colorado."74 The defense ob-
jected to this evidence, but the trial court concluded that the
evidence was admissible.75
On appeal, Tome argued that the trial court erred in permit-
ting the testimony as to A.T.'s prior consistent statements be-
cause, inter alia, the statements were made "after A.T.'s alleged
motive to fabricate a story of abuse arose."7" After analyzing
the conflicting case law, the Tenth Circuit refused to adopt the
pre-motive rule.77 The court reasoned that "the pre-motive rule
is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules." 8
Therefore, the court concluded:
A per se rule is untenable because it is simply not true
that an individual with a motive to lie always will do so.
Rather, the relevance of the prior consistent statement is
more accurately determined by evaluating the strength of
the motive to lie, the circumstances in which the statement
is made, and the declarant's demonstrated propensity to
lie.7
9
The appellate court held that "the district court properly admit-
ted evidence of A.T.'s prior consistent statements under Rule
71. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 699 (1995).
72. Tome, 3 F.3d at 345.
73. Id. at 345-46.
74. Id. at 346.
75. Id. at 346-47.
76. Id. at 349.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 350.
79. Id.
470 [Vol. 29:459
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801(d)(1)(B)" because the district court had looked at the cir-
cumstances surrounding the out-of-court statements, the impli-
cation of a motive by the defense on cross-examination, and the
lack of evidence about the defense's theory of fabrication."
Consequently, the conviction based on this evidence was up-
held.8'
This decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
solidified the rift between the circuits over the proper applica-
tion of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The decision increased the number of
circuits that have refused to adopt the pre-motive rule to six82
in contrast to the six that have adopted it." One year later,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.'
The Supreme Court faced a difficult issue in Tome because
neither Rule 801 nor the Advisory Committee's notes following
the Rule say that the admissibility of prior consistent state-
ments is contingent on the time the statement was made. 5
Because of this omission, the justices were left to choose the
best basis for reading the Rule without any direct guidance
from the authors. Although their methods of analysis were
remarkably similar, the majority and dissent reached opposite
conclusions regarding the requirements for admissibility under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
80. Id. at 351.
81. Id. at 353.
82. The following circuits allow prior consistent statements that post-date the
motive to fabricate: Tome, 3 F.2d at 351; United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094,
1098 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawson, 872 F. 2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ander-
son, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
83. The following circuits have held that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies a pre-motive
rule: United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1450 (8th Cir." 1993); United States v.
Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1391 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893,
904 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1329 (1st Cir. 1988); United
States v. Brennan, 798 F. 2d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Henderson,
717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984).
84. Tome v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1048 (1994) (mem.).
85. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
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B. The Majority Opinion86
1. Flawed Beginnings
The Court opened its opinion with a brief discussion about
the pre-Federal Rules common law approach to the admissibili-
ty of earlier consistent statements. 87 According to Justice Ken-
nedy, the majority of courts required that any prior consistent
statement be made before the alleged motive arose in order to
be admissible." Based on this context, the Court presented the
issue as "whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies this temporal
requirement." 9
Although the Court's statement of the issue seems fair on its
face, it implies that the Rules must be interpreted with the
prior common law evidentiary principles in mind rather than
within their own context like most statutes. This premise con-
travenes the purpose of codifying a standard set of rules. Nor-
mally, when legislators or committees draft a system of rules,
the drafters look to prior rules to incorporate the strengths of
those rules while eliminating their weaknesses. 0 The language
of the rules presents the drafters' version of the best and worst
of the old law but not necessarily the majority view in that
former realm. Thus, the Court's view of the issue in this case
contradicts the intent and purpose of drafting a standard set of
guidelines and affects the remaining analysis of Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
Following a questionable beginning in the Tome opinion, the
majority proceeded with a three-pronged approach to interpret-
ing the Rule. First, the majority looked at the structure and
language of the Rule itself.9" Next, the majority examined the
legislative history as evidenced in the Advisory Committee's
86. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg joined in full. Justice Scalia joined in part and in the judgment.
Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 698 (1995).
87. Id. at 699.
88. Id. at 700.
89. Id.
90. The Advisory Committee took this approach in creating the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
91. 115 S. Ct. at 700-02.
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notes to support its reading of the Rule.92 Finally, the majority
dispensed with the Government's theory that the temporal
requirement is a function of the rules of relevancy.93 While
this method falls in line with the Court's analysis of other
Federal Rules of Evidence and has served the Court well in
those decisions,94 the choice to use this interpretive process
proves inadequate in the Tome decision. An examination of the
majority's three primary arguments illustrates the shortcomings
of this method.
2. Structure and Language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
Initially, the majority's analysis noted the Advisory
Committee's decision to expand the definition of prior consistent
statements as "nonhearsay ... if they are offered to rebut a
charge of 'recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive.' 95 This treatment is uncommon because "Itlhe Rules do
not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status to all prior consis-
tent statements."98 The court gave substantial weight to the
Advisory Committee's decision, dubbing it "instructive [because]
the forms of impeachment within the Rule's coverage are the
ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most
sense."97 However, the majority carried this argument too far.
They asserted that if no temporal requirement exists, "there
appears no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to
rebut other forms of impeachment as well."98 Careful exam-
ination of this proposition reveals several weaknesses.
First, this proposition assumes that timing is the key factor
affecting the reliability of any prior consistent statement. How-
ever, as the dissent noted, the witness may have other motiva-
tions that override the reasons for changing his/her story.99 In
fact, the existence of a motive to lie at the time of the earlier
92. Id at 702-04.
93. Id. at 704-05.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (interpreting Federal Rule
of Evidence 608(b)).
95. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 701 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 702.
99. Id. at 708 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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remarks may not even be the best indicia of reliability. Some-
times other factors, like alternative reasons to tell the truth'0
or the circumstances surrounding the earlier statement,01 in-
dicate that the witness probably told the truth, although a mo-
tive did exist to fabricate a story.
The Court also ignores other possible reasons for selecting
this particular subset of out-of-court statements for preferential
treatment. For example, prior consistent statements admitted
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) could be given special treatment be-
cause they are reliable due to the presence of the witness and
the opposition's right to cross-examine the witness.0 2 Also, ju-
ries often find limiting instructions difficult to follow. The diffi-
culty lies in distinguishing the purposes for admission of evi-
dence and the complex nature of limiting the use of evi-
dence.10 3 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the Advisory
100. Id. Justice Breyer notes that the witness may have overriding motives to tell
the truth.
A speaker might be moved to lie to help an acquaintance. But, suppose
the circumstances also make clear to the speaker that only the truth will
save his child's life. . . . In these and similar situations, special circum-
stances may indicate that the prior statement was made for some reason
other than the alleged improper motivation ...
Id.
101. See United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1275 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that
the existing motive to fabricate, the desire for revenge for breaking off a relationship,
while "not negligible, . . . it is not nearly as strong as the very powerful motive that
criminal defendants may feel to give exculpatory testimony."); United States v.
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 670-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that witnesses can have both
the motive to lie and to tell the truth at the same point in time); see also Brief for
the United States at *23, 1994 WL 262340, Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696
(1995) (No. 93-6892). In that brief, the United States argues that A.T. had little mo-
tive to lie because
it is doubtful that . . [her] dislike [for her father] would have caused
her to repeat a fabrication during the course of a doctor's examination or
an interview by a case worker investigating the abuse . . . [since] there
is no reason to believe that A.T. thought that either the pediatrician or
the case worker could influence the custody decision.
Id.
102. Morgan states that "[w]hen the Declarant is also a witness, it is difficult to
justify classifying as hearsay evidence of his own prior statements" because "[t]he ad-
versary can now expose every element that may carry a danger of misleading the
trier of fact both in the previous statement and in the testimony, and the trier can
judge whether both the previous declaration and the present testimony are reli-
able. . . ." Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 44, at 192.
103. Justice Breyer makes this point in the dissent. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 707-08
(Breyer, J., dissenting). McCormick agrees, stating that "[s]uch a limiting instruction
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Committee had other reasons for treating prior consistent state-
ments differently than other out-of-court statements.0 4
Next, the Court attempted to rebut the United States' argu-
ment that "an out-of-court consistent statement, whenever it
was made, tends to bolster the testimony of a witness and so
tends also to rebut an express or implied charge" of fabrica-
tion. 5 The majority discounts the United States' argument
because it implies that adoption of the government's position
would permit the admissibility of a large number of prior con-
sistent statements.' 6 However, the United States did not con-
tend that all prior statements consistent with trial testimony
should be admitted.' 7 Rather, the government argued that
prior consistent statements made in a context that "suggest[s]
that they were not the product of the discrediting motive"
should be allowed.' 8 This argument is not so readily dis-
missed because only some prior consistent statements will meet
the Rule's rebuttal requirement when taken in context. Also,
Rule 403, which gives a trial judge discretion to keep highly
prejudicial or unreliable statements away from the jury, can
further limit the admissibility of earlier consonant state-
may not always be effective...." MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 59. Weinstein and
Berger follow suit because "as a practical matter, the jury in all probability would
misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction anyway, so there is no good reason for
giving one." JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, %
801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-188 (1994); see also Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed
Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1092-93 (1969)
(questioning the effectiveness of limiting instructions). For an interesting look at the
effects of curative instructions, which are analogous to limiting instructions, see Dale
W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
104. Cf FED. R. EviD. 105 advisory committee's note (citing Bruton v. United
States, 389 U.S. 818 (1968), in which the Court held that the use of a limiting in-
struction did not give sufficient protection to a defendant).
105. 115 S. Ct. at 702.
106. In the language of Justice Kennedy, "[tihe theory would be that, in a broad
sense, any prior statement by a witness concerning the disputed issues at trial would
have some relevance in assessing the accuracy or truthfulness of the witness's in-
court testimony on the same subject." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Brief for the United States at *44-46, 1994 WL 262340, Tome v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
108. Id. at *46.
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ments.0 9 Thus, the majority overstated their concerns and did
not support their interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
Finally, the majority supported its initial conclusion with a
comparison of the Rule's language to the language used in
earlier common law cases upholding the pre-motive rule.' As
the Court noted, "the somewhat peculiar language of the Rule
bears close similarity to the language used in many of the com-
mon law cases adopting the pre-motive requirement.""' Thus,
the majority concludes, "its use of wording which follows the
language of the common law cases, suggests that it was intend-
ed to carry over the common law pre-motive rule." 2
This statement is flawed in two ways. First, despite the
majority's implication to the contrary, not all cases with this
language support the pre-motive rule. In fact, some common
law cases have substantially similar language to that in Rule
801(d)(1)(B) but specifically reject the pre-motive rule."' In
Hangar v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit employed language similar to that used in
the Rule but held that prior consistent statements were admis-
sible even if "made after . . . the motive .. to fabricate was
greatest ... ,"" Thus, the Advisory Committee's use of specif-
ic language does not necessarily imply that the Rule incorpo-
rates the temporal requirement. This language implies only
that the drafters used words often employed by earlier courts.
Second, the Committee might have chosen such familiar lan-
guage for other reasons. For example, the Rule uses "fabrication
or improper influence or motive" which the majority believes
109. FED. R. EvID 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
110. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702.
111. Id.; see United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1403 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding
that "prior consistent statements can only be introduced after a charge [ofl . . . re-
cent fabrication and where the "statements were made before any motive to fabricate
developed"); see also Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir. 1968).
112. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702.
113. See, e.g., Hangar, 398 F.2d at 104; Copes v. United States, 345 F.2d 723, 726
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
114. Hangar, 398 F.2d at 104.
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indicates adoption of the temporal requirement. 5 However,
the Committee could have chosen the Rule's language so that
courts and attorneys would realize what types of impeachment
would warrant the Rule's application. In the Rule, the Advisory
Committee stated that prior consistent statements are admissi-
ble "if offered to rebut" such charges." 6 This usage implies
that what follows is a prerequisite to admissibility. The Com-
mittee then continued with the language "an express or implied
charge ... of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive," to establish what must be shown for prior consonant
statements to be admissible."7 Thus, the Committee could
have been using the familiar language to specify the prerequi-
sites for admissibility rather than indicating a timing require-
ment.
Notwithstanding the flaws in the three main text-based argu-
ments made by the Court, the two most persuasive structural
arguments against the majority's interpretation lie in two stan-
dard canons of construction: 1) expressio unis est exclusio
alterius (exclusio alterius) or "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another;""8 and 2) the plain meaning doctrine.
The Supreme Court previously endorsed the maxim exclusio
alterius."9 In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of Railroad Passengers,2 ' the Court stated that "[wihen
a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it in-
cludes the negative of any other mode."""' Thus, should a
statute list requirements for admissibility so that anything not
set out is assumed to be omitted? With respect to prior consis-
tent statements, the Rule specifies all that is necessary for
their admissibility, so that the declarant must testify and be
available for cross-examination regarding the earlier remarks,
115. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702.
116. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(B).
117. Id.
118. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
119. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (applying
the maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius in the interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act). However, the Court has become increasingly wary of congressional si-
lence as evidence of legislative intent. See William J. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 640 (1990).
120. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
121. Id. at 458 (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. United States 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929)).
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the statement must be "consistent," the statement must be
challenged as a recent fabrication or the product of an improper
motive, and the statement must be offered to "rebut" the al-
leged improper motive.122 The Rule contains no explicit timing
requirement. Also, as noted by the majority, the Advisory
Committee's notes do not even mention the pre-motive rule.2
Though the Court has found such omissions persuasive in earli-
er cases, the majority gave no such deference in this case. 24
The second maxim ignored by the Court, the plain meaning
doctrine, also supports the argument that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does
not contain a temporal requirement. The plain meaning doc-
trine simply states that "a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there."'25 In other
words, the "plain language" of the statute controls. 26 Instead
of applying this maxim, the Court read a temporal requirement
into the word "rebut." The court reasoned that a prior state-
ment does not "rebut" a charge if the same motive to lie existed
at the time of the earlier remarks. 27 However, this interpreta-
tion contravenes the Rule's plain meaning because the Rule
does not state that the evidence "must rebut," only that it be
"offered to rebut" the charges of contamination.'28 The Court's
failure to recognize the plain meaning doctrine coupled with its
omission of the exclusio alterius maxim weakens this first por-
tion of the majority's argument.
3. Use of the Advisory Committee's Notes
The Court then proceeded to discuss the legislative history of
Rule 801, as documented in both the Advisory Committee's
122. FED. R. EvED. 801.
123. See FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
124. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (noting that "[the drafting history [of Rule
702] makes no mention of Frye. .. ").
125. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).
126. See United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988) (rejecting
"petitioner's position, for it is inconsistent with ... the plain language of Rule
404(b)").
127. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 700-02 (1995).
128. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *19-20, 1994 VL 665263, Tome v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892). This strained reading of the Rule is not-
ed by the dissent. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706-10.
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notes and works by the Rules' drafters. Though this method
contravenes the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpreta-
tion, the Court's examination of these sources is consistent with
its past decisions interpreting the Rules."9 Also, an examina-
tion of the Rules' legislative history has often lent support to
the Court's interpretation of the Rules.' However, in this
case, the method proves ineffective because, despite the
majority's contentions otterwise, the legislative history of Rule
801 does not indicate conclusively that the pre-motive rule
exists under the Federal Rules.
The majority pointed to the notes accompanying Rule 801 for
additional support. More specifically, the majority cited the
Committee's failure to state that the Rule "abandoned the pre-
motive requirement" as support for the argument that a tempo-
ral requirement is found in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).' 3' This conclu-
sion is an implicit application of the aforementioned exclusio
alterius maxim which the Court ignored in its analysis of the
structure of Rule 801(d)(1)(b).'32 Though the majority did not
specifically endorse this maxim, their conclusion that the Com-
mittee intended no change because of the absence of any spe-
cific indication that change occurred,' is simply a variation
of the exclusio alterius canon. The majority's application of this
maxim here detracts significantly from the drafters' intent ar-
gument because the majority did not apply this maxim consis-
tently throughout the analysis.
Next, the majority interpreted the Committee's heavy reliance
on two academics, Charles McCormick and John H. Wigmore,
as support for its position. This may be because "[tihroughout
their discussion of the Rules, the Advisory Committee Notes
rely on McCormick and Wigmore as authority for the common
129. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-88 (the Court first looks at the lan-
guage and structure of Rule 404(b), and then at the legislative history behind the
Rule); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (the Court reviews the lan-
guage, structure and legislative history of Rule 801(d)(1)(C)).
130. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688 (stating that the petitioner's argument is "simply
inconsistent with the legislative history behind Rule 404(b)"); see also Owens, 484
U.S. at 562-63 (looking at the legislative history for the reasons to support the carv-
ing of prior identifications out of the hearsay rule).
131. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 703.
132. See supra part IV.B.2.
133. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 703.
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law approach."13 4 The majority then stated that "[i]n light of
the categorical manner in which those authors state the pre-
motive requirement, it is difficult to imagine that the draft-
ers . . . would have remained silent if they intended to modify
the pre-motive requirement."W
3 5
Though this reasoning seems persuasive, the majority under-
mined its argument by refusing to look to McCormick or
Wigmore elsewhere in the opinion to determine whether the
pre-motive requirement is an element of the hearsay or rele-
vance rules.' Again, this inconsistent application of a method
of interpretation detracts from the Court's position. Further-
more, had the majority relied on McCormick earlier in deter-
mining how to classify the pre-motive rule, they would have
found no support. Rather, McCormick's definition lends credence
to the dissent's statement that the Rule is "not hearsay, but
relevance,"'37 because McCormick states that, once contamina-
tion has been charged, "the prior consistent statement has no
relevancy to refute the charge unless the consistent statement
was made before the source ... originated."' 38 Thus, the
majority's use of McCormick seems self-serving as the Court
cites him only when he supports its argument.
The majority looked to McCormick's hornbook on evidence,
and its editor, Edward Cleary, who was the Reporter of the
Advisory Committee. 39 The Court stressed the fact that Pro-
fessor Cleary did not indicate a repudiation of the temporal re-
quirement in McCormick's hornbook when referring to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. "' However, this reliance on Professor
Cleary's omission fails for the same reasons mentioned earlier.
First, the majority implicitly endorses the exclusio alterius max-
im by contending that had there been any change in the tempo-
ral requirement Professor Cleary would have reported this fact
134. Id.
135. Id. This statement also implicitly endorses the exclusio alterius maxim which,
as stated in part IV.B.3 supra, contradicts the majority's earlier refusal to use the
maxim.
136. See id. at 701, 704.
137. Id. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 47 (emphasis added).
139. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 703 (1995).
140. Id.
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in the hornbook." Second, the majority's refusal to acknowl-
edge that Professor Cleary defines the Rule using the term
"relevancy" again seems self-serving.
14 1
Finally, the majority found support for the pre-motive rule in
the "Committee's stated 'unwillingness to countenance the gen-
eral use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence,"'
and in its specific rejection of Uniform Rule of Evidence
63(1)."4 The Court argued that should Rule 801(d)(1)(B) be
read as to contain no temporal requirement, "the distinction
between rejected Uniform Rule 63(1) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
would all but disappear."" However, the distinction between
the two could be retained by adopting the rule set out by the
Tenth Circuit.
First, as the court of appeals indicated, its holding did not
"overlook or devalue the veracity concerns which underlie the
rule [because] 'the trial judge must evaluate whether, in light
of the potentially powerful motive to fabricate, the prior consis-
tent statement has significant "probative force bearing on credi-
bility apart from mere repetition."' 4Thus, not every state-
ment will come in under this test because the trial judge will
only accept those statements that have a probative value apart
from repetition.
Second, the majority does not give enough credit to the
exclusionary value of the requirement that "recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive" must be shown.'46 Despite
the Court's implication to the contrary, "not every attempt to
impeach a witness's credibility constitutes a charge of fabrica-
tion."47  In other words, statements offered under Rule
141. See id.
142. See id; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 47.
143. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 703; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory comittee
note. Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) allows admission of any out-of-court statement
by a declarant who is present at trial and available for cross-examination. UNIF. R.
EvID. 63(1) (1953).
144. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 703.
145. United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Pierre,
781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986))).
146. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B).
147. Gaines v. Walker, 986 F.2d 1438, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 1991).
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801(d)(1)(B) are often kept out due to the lack of an "assertion
[that the witness] . . . has recently changed her testimony from
what it was before because of some recent influence or motiva-
tion."14 s Although this determination is within the discretion
of the trial court, 149 appellate courts have overturned trial
judges' rulings when there was clearly no accusation of contam-
ination or falsification. 50
4. Hearsay, Not Relevancy
The government's final argument for rejecting the pre-motive
rule was based on Article IV of the Rules. More specifically, the
argument was based on Rule 401, which sets the standard for
what evidence is relevant. 5' Rule 401 liberalized the relevan-
cy requirement for admissibility, a change noted by the Su-
preme Court in past decisions.'52 The government took the po-
sition that this liberalization affected the common law temporal
requirement by making some prior statements relevant, and
thus admissible, even though the declarations were made after
the alleged motive arose. 5 ' The Court rejected the
government's assertion first by failing to recognize that the
timing element is truly a function of the relevancy rules and
148. Byrd v. Lionville Mfg. Co., 1988 WL 97662 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Mecca v.
Gibraltar Corp., 746 F. Supp. 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (excluding statements
"[blecause there had been no charge of recent fabrication."); United States v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., 87 F.R.D 411, 421 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (referring to
a ruling by the trial court excluding a document offered "after cross-examination as a
prior consistent statement to rebut an alleged charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, it was again excluded when the court determined that there was
no such charge, express or implied, in the record").
149. United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The trial
court must determine . . . whether there has been a charge of recent fabrication,
improper influence or motive. .. ").
150. See Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (1970) (holding that a
.statement made two months after the injury has no sufficient logical tendency to
show that statements made within a week were incomplete").
151. FED. R. EVID. 401; Brief for the United States at *28-31, 1994 WL 262340,
Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
152. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2793-94 (1993) (rejecting the strict common law relevancy standards in the realm of
expert testimony).
153. Brief for the United States at *28-31, 1994 WL 262340, Tome v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
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then, by mischaracterizing the effects of not having a temporal
requirement."
First, the Court does not address whether the pre-motive rule
is merely a manifestation of the strict common law relevancy
requirement. Instead, the majority marginalized the debate by
claiming that the United States' position contradicted the
"Rules' general proscription of hearsay testimony.... 'M A
though the majority correctly stated that there is a general
disdain for hearsay testimony, it failed to consider the Rules'
exceptions for certain out-of-court statements.5 ' The United
States contended that the relevancy provisions also affect the
acceptable out-of-court statements because once the criteria for
admissibility set out in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are met, the evidence
must remain relevant to be admissible.'57 The government's
position is the more logical reading of the Federal Rules as a
whole because every piece of evidence must be relevant to be
admissible.' Also, any out-of-court statement must meet one
of the provisions in Rule 801, Rule 803, or Rule 804 to be ad-
missible.'59 The sole test for acceptable evidence is not as the
majority implied.
Next, the majority overstated the effects that a rejection of
the temporal requirement would have on trial work. 6 ' The
Court expressed its concern that, without the pre-motive rule,
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) "involves considerable judicial discretion;...
reduces predictability; and . . enhances the difficulties of trial
preparation because parties will have difficulty knowing in
advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements will
be admitted." 6' However, these factors do not justify the
Court's rejection of the Tenth Circuit's balancing test because
each factor also applies to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) with a temporal
requirement.'62
154. See Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 704.
155. Id.
156. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804.
157. Brief for the United States at *28-31, 1994 WL 262340, Tome v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995) (No. 93-6892).
158. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
159. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804.
160. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 704-05 (1995).
161. Id.
162. 115 S. Ct. at 704-05 (rejecting the Tenth Circuit's balancing test). For an
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With regard to the majority's first concern, judicial discretion,
the existence of the pre-motive rule under the Federal Rules
does not eliminate the power of the trial judge to determine
whether the witness has been accused of changing her testimo-
ny.'63 The Court's concern about predictability is also overrat-
ed because, under the current system, there is no way of know-
ing what improper motive the opposition will allege. Although
trial counsel may believe that a motive arose on January 1,
1990, the trial court may find a pre-existing motive and exclude
statements which counsel had heretofore believed to be admissi-
ble. In essence, no less predictability exists under the proposed
new rule because no litigant can predict which motive the oppo-
sition will plead. Finally, lack of forewarning should not con-
cern the Court because each side is on notice that any state-
ment might be proffered in rebuttal and, consequently, each
side will be prepared to argue about each statement's admissi-
bility.
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
1. Justice Scalia's Rationale for the Temporal Requirement: A
Hypocritical Precedent
Justice Scalia opened his concurrence by criticizing the Court
for examining the legislative history of the Rule." During the
course of his tenure, Scalia has steadily taken this position and
the Supreme Court has recently become more receptive to his
position.'65 Though his criticism may be worthy of review,
Justice Scalia's own rationale in support of the temporal rule
falls victim to the same attack set forth against the majority
opinion.
articulation of the balancing test, see United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th
Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986))).
163. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
164. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (examining the Advisory Committee's notes for guid-
ance).
165. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662 (1994) ("We did not
resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear."). For a discussion
of this development and the changes in interpretive approaches by the Court, see
generally Eskridge, supra note 119, at 621.
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Justice Scalia opened his analysis of Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(B) by stating that "[ilt is well established that 'the
body of common law knowledge' must be .""a source of
guidance"" in our interpretation of the rules."'66 However, Jus-
tice Scalia quotes the exact type of source that he claims the
Court should not examine. He cites a law review article by
Edward Cleary, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee, on
how to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence. 67 Thus, his
argument is weakened due to his inconsistent application of his
own interpretive maxium.
2. Justice Scalia's Endorsement of the Majority's Points
Justice Scalia follows his opening premise by pointing out
two other reasons why reading Rule 801(d)(1)(B) with a tempo-
ral requirement is logical. First, he states that the Rule "uses
language that tracks common law cases.... . 6" However, not
all common law cases using language similar to that in Rule
801(d)(1)(B) endorse the temporal requirement. 9 Other rea-
sons also exist for choosing specific language, such as indicating
which forms of impeachment trigger the application of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) 70
Next, Justice Scalia states that "only the pre-motive-state-
ment limitation makes it rational to admit a prior corroborating
statement" in response to a charge of contamination or falsifica-
tion and not for other forms of impeachment. 7' This assertion
is flawed in two significant ways. First, Justice Scalia assumes
that timing is the primary factor when determining the reliabil-
ity of a prior consistent statement. This assumption is not val-
id.' Second, other reasons exist for granting these specific
statements specialized treatment, such as the witness' presence
166. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52
(1984) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evi-
dence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978)))).
167. Id.
168. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706.
169. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
171. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706.
172. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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in court and availability for cross-examination.'73 Consequent-
ly, even if one disregards the crack in the foundation of Justice
Scalia's argument, the remaining points do not support his
position.
D. The Dissent174
1. Relevancy, Not Hearsay
The dissent opened by questioning the majority's contention
that the issue is one of hearsay rather than relevancy.'75 To
do so, they pointed to McCormick's definition of the pre-motive
rule, which speaks in terms of a post-motive statement's
"[ir]relevancy.""'6 Justice Stephen Breyer then dismantled the
Court's claim that the temporal requirement is the only justifi-
cation for giving a prior consistent statement special treatment
as nonhearsay."'
The decision to treat prior consistent statements differently
when offered to rebut a charge of improper motive is also pre-
dicted on a hearsay-based concern. This concern involves the
jurors' ability to "distinguish between the rehabilitative and
substantive use of the kind of statements listed in Rule
801(d)(1)(B).""'8 However, the reason for this distinction does
not support a pre-motive requirement because the timing of a
statement has no bearing on a jury's difficulty with limiting
instructions."'9 Thus, the dissent came to the more reasonable
conclusion that the selective treatment given to certain
statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is not based on a temporal
requirement. Furthermore, because Rule 801(d)(1)(B) addresses
a hearsay issue founded on concerns unrelated to the pre-mo-
tive rule, the dissent concluded that any temporal requirement
173. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
174. Justice Breyer authored the dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice Thomas joined. 115 S. Ct. at 706-10.
175. Id. at 706-07.
176. Id. at 707; see MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 47.
177. 115 S. Ct. at 707-08.
178. Id. at 707; see also supra note 103.
179. 115 S. Ct. at 707-08.
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must come from the relevancy provisions of the Federal
Rules. 180
Justice Breyer then looked at Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to determine
the prerequisites to admissibility imposed on prior consistent
statements. Over and above the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)
that the witness testify at trial and be subject to cross-
examination, 8' the dissent concluded that a statement may be
properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) if it is 1) "consistent
with the declarant's testimony," and 2) offered to rebut a charge
of fabrication or improper influence.'82 However, this still
leaves the question of whether the relevancy standard under
the Federal Rules allows some post-motive statements to be ad-
mitted.8
3
2. The Abolishment of the Temporal Requirement by the
Liberal Concept of Relevancy under the Federal Rules
of Evidence
The dissent proceeded to look at Rule 401 to determine its
effect on the admissibility of statements under Rule
801(d)(1)(B). The dissent cited five reasons in support of its con-
clusion that the relevancy provisions do not bar all post-motive
statements: 1) some post-motive statements are relevant to the
issue of credibility and truth; 2) the common law pre-motive
rule was not uniformly endorsed; 3) Rule 401 liberalized the
standard for relevancy; 4) Rule 403 authorizes judges to exclude
some post-motive statements; and 5) the drafters probably
would not have relied on such an indirect method with which to
include the pre-motive rule.'4 Each of these reasons is dis-
cussed individually below.
First, statements can be relevant in a number of situations
despite a motive to falsify. For example, "[a] post-motive state-
ment is relevant to rebut ... when the speaker made the prior
statement while affected by a far more powerful motive to tell
180. Id. at 708.
181. Id.; see also FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(1).
182. 115 S. Ct. at 708.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 708-09.
1995] 487
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the truth."185 Spontaneous statements by the witness, analo-
gous to the excited utterances exception to hearsay testimony in
Rule 803(2),188 are also more likely truthful and, accordingly,
may be relevant.187 Thus, the majority's claim that no post-
motive statement can be relevant is simply not true.
Next, the dissent challenged the Court's conclusion that
courts uniformly endorsed the pre-motive rule prior to the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules. First, the dissent pointed out that a
minority of jurisdictions "recognized that postmotive statements
could be relevant . *...""' Also, the dissent noted that even in
the jurisdictions that imposed the temporal requirement, no
explanation was given as to why an absolute rule should ex-
ist."89 The lack of explanation is noteworthy because it sup-
ports the theory that the rule was adhered to because of histor-
ical value rather than for its logic.
Third, the dissent cited Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., as an indication that the relevancy provi-
sions of the Federal Rules are more liberal than the prior com-
mon law."' Specifically, the dissenting justices pointed out
that "Daubert suggests that the liberalized relevancy provisions
of the Federal Rules can supersede a pre-existing rule of rele-
vance, at least where no compelling practical or logical support
can be found for the pre-existing rule." 9' Furthermore, since
no strong reasons can be found to support the preservation of
the temporal requirement, Daubert and Federal Rule 401
should be interpreted as abolishing it. 9 '
The dissent also reasoned that the existence of Federal Rule
403 lends support to the repudiation of a temporal requirement.
Federal Rule 403 allows a judge to preclude "the barely rele-
vant, the time wasting, and the prejudicial. ."9 This flexi-
185. Id. at 708.
186. FED. R. EViD. 803(2).
187. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 708; see also United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255,
1275 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a spontaneous statement was relevant when made
after an alleged motive to lie existed).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
191. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 709.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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ble provision partially supplants the common law pre-motive
rule by codifying a judge's power to exclude those post-motive
statements not sufficiently probative in light of the purpose
offered. 194 Rule 403 would be considered with each determina-
tion of admissibility under a balancing test approach. In effect,
this would add another safeguard against the possible admis-
sion of prepared statements.
Finally, the dissent pointed to the most obvious reason for
the removal of the temporal requirement-Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and
the accompanying Advisory Committee's note are silent about
any timing requirement. 95 Although the drafters may have
assumed that the rule would be applied without question, "this
would have been a remarkably indirect (and therefore odd) way
of doing so . . . ."' Thus, it is unlikely that the Committee
would have preserved the temporal requirement in such a
vague manner.
In sum, the dissent's more reasonable interpretation of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) leads to the more logical conclusion that the tempo-
ral requirement was eliminated for two main reasons. First, the
Rule does not mention anything about limiting admissibility
based on the timing of the prior consistent statements in re-
lation to the motive to fabricate. The majority's refusal to give
due deference to this omission by the Advisory Committee con-
tradicts both the Court's own precedent and traditional rules of
statutory construction. The dissent recognized the value of the
Committee's silence on the temporal requirement by taking it
as an indication that any strict rule on timing had been aban-
doned with the adoption of the Federal Rules.
Second, the Court failed to recognize the effects of the Rule's
relevancy provisions on other portions of the Federal Rules.
This failure was caused by the majority's mischaracterization of
the pre-motive rule as hearsay-based when the concerns under-
lying its application are different from the rationale behind the
general proscription of hearsay testimony. Had the majority
correctly categorized the temporal requirement as did the dis-
194. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
195. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 709; FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee note.
196. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 709 (quoting Justice Breyer); see also supra notes 120-25
and accompanying text.
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sent, the more reasonable conclusion that the temporal require-
ment was abolished would follow.
V. FORWARD FROM THE TOME DECISION: THE NEGATIVE
EFFECTS ON CHILD MOLESTATION PROSECUTIONS
The Court's adherence to the antiquated pre-motive rule will
affect cases which most often involve impeachment on the
grounds of recent falsification. Such cases include many types of
criminal cases, including child molestation cases like Tome. The
effects of the temporal requirement are best illustrated by ap-
plying it to the facts of Tome.
The Tome Court's holding that only pre-motive statements
are admissible under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will have a
negative effect on child abuse prosecutions in two specific ways.
First, the existence of an alleged motive for fabrication is more
likely with child abuse cases, thus the chances of keeping prior
consistent statements from being admitted are increased. Sec-
ond, the addition of the temporal requirement to the difficulties
inherent in any case with a child witness will discourage
prosecutions for child abuse.
First, in most cases involving allegations of child molestation,
defense counsel will accuse the child of fabricating the charg-
es.197 Most of the time, the alleged motive to fabricate will
predate the prior consistent statements which will render the
statements inadmissible.19 This will enable the defense to
prevent any corroborating statement from coming before the
jury so long as counsel can allege a motive that arose before
the statements were made. The Tome case provides an excellent
illustration.
In Tome, the defendant and his former wife were in a legal
battle over physical custody of their allegedly abused child, A.T.
The abuse allegations arose during the custody dispute, impli-
cating a possible motive for fabrication at the time the charges
of abuse were first made. The possible motive was that A.T.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 349 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1471 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991).
198. See Tome, 3 F.3d at 349; Payne, 944 F.2d at 1471 n.12.
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wanted to live with her mother. The defense could allege this
motive on cross-examination and any prior consistent state-
ments would be prohibited because the custody fight occurred
long before the alleged incident of abuse. Ironically, in the case
of a custody fight, a child might not be claiming abuse in order
to live with the non-abusive parent. Rather, the child may want
to live with the mother due to the abuse. In addition, allega-
tions of fabrication that trigger the temporal requirement never
have to be substantiated. Due to the lack of a substantiation
requirement, the possibility of abuse is high.
Despite these concerns, the pre-motive rule prohibits these
statements from ever being admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
rather than allowing a court to do a common sense analysis to
see whether the statements have a sufficient indicia of reliabili-
ty to be admissible. Courts could, for example, determine
whether the child testified at the original custody hearing re-
garding her preference with respect to living arrangements.
Also, the court might analyze statements regarding custody
preference made by the child to other relatives and friends
prior to the allegations of abuse. Finally, the court might look
to the circumstances surrounding the earlier statements and
the strength of the motive to lie. In any situation, the trial
court would have some flexibility in determining whether earli-
er consonant declarations by the child are admissible.
Second, the difficulty in satisfying the temporal requirement
in child abuse cases places one more burden on a prosecutor
who already faces a difficult situation due to the inherent chal-
lenges of basing a case around a child witness. Child witnesses
present more difficult situations for the following reasons: 1)
unlike adults, "the testimony of a child witness is perish-
able;"199 2) child witnesses often find testifying a frightening
experience;.. and 3) even when the child remembers and suc-
cessfully braves being on the stand, the child's testimony is
199. Dirk Lorenzen, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases
Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1068 (1988); see
also State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 377-78 (Iowa 1986) (reporting that the
child accuser could not remember the alleged incident of sexual misconduct).
200. John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination,
Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801, 805 (1987).
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almost always hindered by his limited linguistic ability.2"'
When these problems occur, the prosecution often turns to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) to permit corroborating testimony. However, the
availability of this approach is now severely limited. Conse-
quently, a prosecutor presented with a young child alleging
abuse will be more reluctant to seek criminal charges.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tome Court's reading of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B) is strained and counterintuitive. The majority over-
looks the most obvious arguments against the existence of a
temporal requirement while emphasizing the marginal ones. In
the end, the majority's decision seems to be based more on the
venerable history of the temporal requirement than on any
logical foundation. Because of the Court's stasis, prosecutors
will now face a predicament in certain criminal cases because a
likely motive existed at any time a prior consistent statement
was uttered. Unfortunately, after Tome, trial courts have no
choice but to exclude all post-motive declarations in every case
without regard to the reliability of the individual comment.
This is an outcome that does not promote justice in our courts.
Christopher A. Jones
201. Lorenzen, supra note 199, at 1068.
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